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On July 10, 1963, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed two
lower court decisions by ruling that a policeman, in the per-
formance of his duty, could not recover after falling into an
unguarded and unlighted excavation.1 The excavation was on the
defendant's premises and the plaintiff was on the property during
the night while investigating a possible break-in. The court de-
cided as per the majority rule, that a policeman is a mere licensee
on privately owned premises and enters not by express or implied
invitation but under authority of law. It is all but universally
held 2 that the owner of property is not liable for the personal
injuries of a licensee unless a statute to protect such people is
violated3 or if there is willful or winton misconduct or some
affirmative act of negligence.4 None of these conditions were
present in the case in point.
In most of the early decisions which involved personal in-
juries to licensees the courts felt that the owner of the premises
should not be liable unless the injury was intentional, willful or
wanton.5 However, a more humane and reasonable outlook has
been taken recently and the courts have held that the owner of
such premises must warn a licensee of any "traps" or concealed
dangerous conditions. 6 The owner is now also held liable for
any active acts of negligence by him or his agents.Y There is
a trend toward broadening the class of people who are now con-
sidered invitees or "business guests." Public employees, such as
meat inspectors,8 building inspectors,9 garbage collector',1x post-
' Scheurer v. Trustees of Open Bible Church, 192 N.E.2d 38.2 Prosser on Torts-2nd Ed, p. 461 and cases cited.
Restatement of Torts-Sec. 341.
C.]S.-65-Negligence-p. 482 and cases cited.
3 Meiers v. Fred Kock Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491, 13 A.L.R. 633
(1920).4 Penn. R. Co. v. Vitti, Admr, 111 Ohio St. 670, 677, 146 N.E, 96 (1924).5 0'Brien v. Union Freight R. Co, 209 Mass. 449, 95 NE. 861 (1911); Cleve-
land, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Potter, 1925, 113 Ohio St. 591, 150 N.E. 44(1925).
6 Smith v. Southwest Missouri R. Co, 1933, 333 Mo. 314, 62 S.W.2d 761
(1933).
7 Supra note 4.
8 Swift & Co. v. Schuster, 10 Cir. 1951, 192 F.2d 615.
9 Fred Howland, v. Morris, 143 Fla. 189, 196 So. 472 (1940).
10 Toomey v. Sanborn, 146 Mass. 28, 14 N.E. 921 (1888).
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men," and meter readers12 have been given the same protection
as invitees. The importance of this is that an occupier of private
property owes the duty of ordinary care to make the premises
safe for the invitees'3 and, therefore, the policeman in Scheurer v.
Trustees of the Open Bible Church would have been able to
recover had he been considered an invitee. This problem has yet
to be considered in Virginia. However, there is no reason to be-
lieve that the Virginia courts would rule contra to the majority.
It seems odd to include all public employees other than
policemen (and firemen) 14 in the class of invitees while so notice-
ably refusing this privilege to the officers of the law. A licensee
is defined as one who
". .. is on the premises by permission or sufferance
only, and not by virtue of any business or contractual rela-
tion with the owner or occupant inuring to the mutual
benefit of both ... "
"... and in that he is a licensee, or may be inferred to
be such, only where his entry or presence on the premises
is merely in his own interest and for his own purposes, bene-
fit, convenience, or pleasure, or on business with others than
the owner of the premises, so that the distinction (between
an invitee and a licensee) turns largely on the nature of the
business that brings the person on the premises, rather than
the words or acts of the owner which precede his coming." 15
From this widely accepted definition it is difficult to understand
why the policeman is not classified as an invitee. It is quite ob-
vious that the policeman, while performing his official function,
is not on the premises for his own pleasure or benefit. Rather, the
person who benefits from his presence is the property owner.
Although his presence does not make foreseeable any economic
gain, it is highly possible that he will prevent an economic loss
to the owner.
11 Paubel v. Hitz, 1936, 339 Mo. 274, 96 S.W.2d 369 (1936).
12 Sheffield Co. v. Phillips, 1943, 69 Ga. App. 41, 24 S.E.2d 834 (1943).
13 Prosser on Torts-2nd ed.-p. 452.
14 Steinwedel v. Hilbert, 149 Md. 121, 131 A. 44 (1925); Aldworth v. F. WV.
Woolworth Co, 295 Mass. 344, 3 N.E.2d 1008 (1936).
15 C.JS.-65-Neg., p. 481 (emphasis added).
In Scheurer v. Trustees of th,? Open Bible Church the court,
realizing this enigma, attempted to meet it with these solutions:
the policeman is by precedent held to be a licensee; the police-
man enters the premises under authority of law and therefore
may enter at unforeseeable times when the owner could not con-
ceivably know of his presence or give warning of hidden dangers;
the service which the policeman performs is to the community
as a whole and therefore the community, and not the individual,
should be penalized if injury should be sustained in the line of
duty.'6 The first explanation (stare decisis) is valid only if re-
tained because it is the logical and reasonable view, or if to change
it would mean destroying many rights commonly accepted today.
But this, of course, is not to say that when a precedent follows
time to illogic it should still be preserved. Indeed, it would ap-
pear that the policeman-licensee doctrine is doing just that, if it
were not for the second and strongest point in its behalf which
the court stated in Scheurer.
Invitees are allowed to recover for personal injuries they
sustain without fault because it is deemed that they are "invited"
to enter premises which are impliedly safe for their occupation. 1'
This duty of affirmative care imposed upon the owner of the
premises is the obligation he owes for the benefit which he re-
ceives. The major difference between the invitee and the police-
man is that the invitee is expected to be on the premises and so
can be warned of any hazards; of course, this is nearly impossible
as to a policeman who may enter at any time and under the most
unusual conditions. The owner in the latter case has little oppor-
tunity to protect himself by offering warning. "A man who
climbs in through a basement window in search of a fire or a thief
cannot expect any assurance that he will not find a bulldog in
the cellar." 1s
The court's third point was that society should pay if the
policeman is injured. Ohio accomplishes this by including the
police under Workmen's Compensation. This, however, would
appear to be more of a justification than an argument. Although
16 Scheurer v. Trustees of Open Bible Church, op. cit.
17 Prosser on Torts, op. cit., p. 454;
Restatement of Torts, Sec. 332, 343, comment a.
18 Prosser on Torts, op. cit., p. 462.
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it is true that society in general does benefit from the policeman's
services it is a more concrete service to the individual property
owner he is protecting at the moment of the policeman's injury.
The dissenting opinion in Scheurer urged, too, that damages re-
covered under Workmen's Compensation are usually for less than
those obtained through a personal action for negligence.19
Only Illinois has thus far completely rejected the policeman-
licensee doctrine in favor of a policeman-invitee rule. That
Supreme Court stated,
"... it is our opinion that since the common-law rule
labelling firemen (policemen) as licensees is but an illogical
anachronism, orginating in a vastly different social order,
and pock-marked by judicial refinements, it should not be
perpetuated in the name of 'stare decisis'. That doctrine does
not confine our courts to the 'Calf Path', nor to any rule
currently enjoying a numerical superiority of adherents.
'Stare decisis' ought not to be the excuse for decision where
reason is lacking." 20
But, "Although," as Prosser states, "there has been long con-
tinued criticism from legal writing directed at the rule denying
recovery to firemen and policemen, with occasional dissenting
opinions, and even doubts expressed by the majority applying
the rule, the Illinois case (Dini v. Naiditch) thus far stands
alone in rejecting it outright." 21
W. T. L.
19 Scheurer v. Trustees of Open Bible Church, op. cit.2
o Dini v. Naiditch, 20 M. 2nd. 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
21 Prosser and Smith, Cases and Materials on Torts, p. 528.
